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Vincent H. Smith
Abstract  depreciation allowances  and marginal tax  rates on
This paper uses a deterministic asset replacement  optimal asset replacement decisions.
model to examine the implications of the  1986 Tax  The  analytical  results  presented  below  indicate
Reform  Act (TRA)  for replacement investment  in  that, ceterisparibus,  the abolition of the investment
U.S. agriculture.  The optimal replacement age for  tax credit and reductions in the present values of tax
an asset is shown to be inversely related to the size  depreciation  allowances  will  increase  optimal  re-
of investment  tax  credits  and the present  value of  placement  ages  and  reduce  optimal  replacement
depreciation  allowances  but generally  directly  re-  rates.  On the other hand, reductions in marginal tax
lated to marginal tax rate.  Simulation results indi-  rates are likely to reduce optimal replacement ages
cate  that  the  net  effects  of the  TRA  vary  across  and increase optimal replacement  rates.  However,
assets.  Replacement  ages for assets with relatively  the joint effects  of the three provisions are analyti-
long depreciation lives (e.g., farm structures) tend to  cally ambiguous;  therefore, a new simulation tech-
fall.  Those for assets with relatively  short depreci-  nique  is used to resolve the issue.  The simulation
ation lives rise (e.g., tractors).  technique  is  innovative  because,  in  contrast  with
models used in previous studies, it does not require
Key words:  agriculture, investment, replacement,  information about the intertemporal  cost and reve-
taxes.  nue streams  associated  with a specific asset.  The
,Tr  I,  8  T  erA  A  daapproach  is used to  assess  whether  asset replace-
The 1986 Tax Reform Act (TRA) radically altered  ment rates for three types of assets will increase or
the  environment  in  which  farmers  make  choices  decrease  as  a result  of the  provisions of the  1986
about the timing of asset replacements  and net in-  TRA.  The assets examined are  (1) equipment  and
vestment.  This paper is concerned with the effects  machinery  with  short  tax  depreciation  schedules
of three  aspects  of the  new  tax  laws  that  directly  (e.g., pickup trucks),  (2) equipment and machinery
affect  farm  asset  replacement  decisions:  (1)  the  with  longer tax  depreciation  schedules  (e.g.,  trac-
abolition  of the  investment  tax  credit,  (2)  adjust-  tors), and (3) farm structures.  The simulation results
ments in  the  depreciation  schedules  permitted  for  suggest  that the  TRA provisions are  likely to  de-
tax purposes, and (3) adjustments in the structure of  crease  asset replacement  rates  for  equipment  and
marginal tax rates that are likely to reduce marginal  machinery, but to increase them for farm structures.
personal income tax rates or marginal corporate tax
rates for most farms (Durst).  AN ANALYTICAL  MODEL OF THE
A theoretical asset replacement  model is used to  EFFECTS OF THE TRA ON ASSET
examine the individual effects of each of the above  REPLACEMENT
adjustments.  The model is similar in its basic struc-  The analytical model  developed here  is an  asset
ture to those  developed by  Perrin; Chisholm;  Kay  replacement  model  similar  to  the  type  originally
and Rister; Bates, Rayner, and Custance;  Bates and  suggested by Perrin that has been utilized by others
Rayner;  Bartholomew;  Reid and Bradford;  Trapp;  (with  some  variations)  to  examine  farm  asset re-
and Lynne.  However,  an alternative  derivation  is  placement decisions  in several  studies  (e.g.,  Chis-
also  provided  for  the  result  originally  shown  by  holm; Kay and Rister; Bates, Rayner, and Custance;
Chisholm (p. 779) that an increase in investment tax  Bartholomew;  Bates  and Rayner;  Reid and  Brad-
credits  will reduce optimal asset replacement ages.  ford; Trapp; Lynne).  In this model, the farm-firm  is
In addition, two new  analytical results are obtained  assumed  to maximize  the present value of the net
concerning  the effects of changes in the structure of  income stream associated with a particular category
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113of assets over an infinite time horizon.  The firm is  same type on a continuous basis then the PV of the
assumed to be certain about the size of all revenue  net income stream is:
and cost streams associated with the asset and to be  (2a)  C[Oso]  = C[0,s,1] + ePS C[Os,1]
free  to replace it with an identical new asset at any  + e 2PS C[ Os,1  + 
moment in time.  At the moment of replacement  a
new  sequence  of cost and revenue  streams is initi- 
ated and the sequence  is replicated  at each  subse-  (2b)  C[0,s,oo]  = [1-  e  -P]  C[0 ,s,1],
quent  moment  of replacement.  If the  net income  and s is selected to maximize equation (2).
stream  is defined in nominal terms, assuming  con-  Perrin's model has to be adjusted to reflect the tax
stant relative prices and a constant expected rate of  environment that was created by the 1981 Economic
inflation,  all  incomes  and  outlays  (including  tax  Recovery Tax Act (ERTA) and modified  under the
credits and allowances) will increase at the expected  TRA.  The ERTA permitted an investment tax credit
rate of inflation.  However, the before-tax discount  at the end of the first period of ownership, a flexible
rate will also include an inflationary premium and  depreciation  schedule,  and  also  took  account  of
in real terms each stream of net incomes associated  balancing charge adjustments.  Such an adjustment
with each new asset will have the same present value  of the  asset
over the life of the asset.  Changes  in the expected (for scrap or other purposes)  is greater or less than rate of inflation will alter optimal replacement ages  i  w  because-~ (a aes  anrad  tac  a  the difference  between  the original purchase  price because  (as Bates,  Rayner,  and  Custance  have because  (as Bates,  Rayner,  and  Custance  have  of the machine  and depreciation  charges  taken  for pointed  out)  investment  tax  credits,  depreciation
allowances,  and  balance  charge  adjustments  are  tax  purposes  over  the  ife  of  the  machine.  The
based on historical costs; thus their present value to  excess deficit (balance)  charge is subject to tax (tax
the farm will change.  In  this paper, however, only  relief) at the time the asset is scrapped.  When the
the  ff  f changen t  s aro  er,  effects  of  changes in tax lawrevenues  are  of conce  a  taken  into
thus the  analysis  can be carried  out under  the as-  account,  the  PV  of an  asset's  income  stream  be-
sumption that the inflation rate is constant and that  comes:
the acquisition of a new asset results in the replica-  s
tion of real income streams.  (3)  C[0,s,1] = (1 - T)  R(t)ePtdt-M(0)
0
The Asset Replacement Model  + M(s)e - s + Ie P + TJ  D(t)e-Ptdt
0
Using Perrin's notation, the present value (PV) of  - D(t)dt + M(s) - M(0)  e-s,
the net revenue streams  associated with  a specific  o
unit of the asset may be written as:
where  T  is the  marginal  tax  rate,  D(a)  is  the tax
(1)  C[0,s,1] = Jl R(t) e  Ptdt + M(s)e- s - M(0),  depreciation permitted for the asset at age a, and I is
°  the investment tax credit taken at the end of the first
where C[0,s,1]  is the present value of the stream of  time period in which  the asset is owned.  This in-
residual earnings of one unit of the asset purchased  come  stream  consists  of the  present  value  of the
at  age  0  and  disposed  of  at  age  s;  t  is  time;  farm's  after-tax  residual  earnings,  (-T)
p= ln(l+r), where p is the interest rate which, when  s
compounded  continuously,  results  in  an  annual  J  R(t)ePtdt, plus the sum of the present values of
growth rate of  r; M(a) is the market value of the asset 
at age  a; and R(a) is  the  flow of residual  earnings  investment tax credit obtained a year after pur-
(current revenues less current costs) associated with  chase, Ie P,  the depreciation  tax credits that accrue
the asset at age a.1 over its life,  TJ  D(t)e-Pdt,  and its market value at
If the firm plans to cease the activities associated  o
with  the  asset  after  one  cycle  then  the  problem  the time of disposal,  M(s)e  t,  less the sum of the
reduces to selecting the  value for s that maximizes  acquisition  cost of  the  machine,  M(0),  and  the
equation (1).  On the other hand, if the firm intends  present  value  of  the  tax  liabilities  associated
to replace the currently held asset with others of the  with  the  balance  charge  item
1In equation  (1),  the asset's age is equal to t.  However, in the infinite horizon model that permits asset replacement,  the age of
the currently held asset will be less than t if it is not the initial asset.  Thus, at the outset, a distinction is made between the age of the
asset,  a, and the point of time in the firm's planning horizon,  t.
114SFd  1  the  asset  itself  at  s  while  the  third  term, T  D(t)dt - M(s)+  M(0)  e.  The  balance  s  ]
0  .^  . - . -pT  J  D(t) dt + M(s) - M(0)  , represents  the  in-
charge  itself  consists  of  the  term  in  brackets, 
s D(t)dt  terest yield on the balance adjustment tax liabilities
o D(t)dt + M(s) - M(0), and is the sum of depreci-  avoided at s by delaying disposal of the asset.  Con-
ation  allowances  and the  market value  of the ma-  sequently, the  RHS of (5a) represents  the opportu-
chine  at the  moment  of disposal  less  the  original  nity cost for the firm of holding the assets  at s and
price of the machinent  of d  l  ls  t  o  the first order condition simply requires that at s the
marginal  revenue  from  the  asset be  equal  to  the
First Order Conditions for Optimal  marginal cost of holding it.
Replacement  Decisions
Effects  of Changes in the Tax Structure on
The  first  order condition  for  the  solution  to the  Optimal Replacement  Decisions
continual  asset  replacement  problem  defined  by
equations (2) and (3) is:  Equation  (5b)  can be used more  conveniently  to
examine how changes in the tax structure affect the
selection of the optimal replacement age.  The LHS
a( o  C[0,s,oo]  -pe- of (5b) is unaffected  by changes  in any element of
as  [l - e-Ps]2  the  tax  structure  but  is  assumed  to  be  inversely
related  to changes  in  s; that is,  as equipment ages,
_+  1  C[O,s,1]  _  either the marginal cost of operating  the asset rises,
[I - e-PS]  as  or its marginal product declines, or both phenomena
occur (and at a rate sufficient to offset any reductions Substituting and rearranging terms, (4) becomes Sbtttn  n r'  in  the  rate  at  which  the  remaining  value  of  the
(5a)  (1 -T) [R(s) + M'(s)]  P= C[0,s,l]  equipment  declines)-plausible  assumptions  for a
1 - e- ]  wide range of physical assets.  Thus any changes in
+ pM(s) - p  fJ  D(t)dt + M(s) - M(O)1 the tax laws that increase the value of the right hand
L  °o  side of equation (5b)  will reduce the optimal value
for  s.  The  tax  code  adjustments  examined  here
or, dividing throughout by (l-T),  include  changes  in  the investment  tax  credit,  the
(5b)  R(s)M's)=  ] +  present  value  of depreciation  allowances  and  the
((5-Tb)  R(s)+M(1  -P]  marginal  tax rate. (l-T) [  1-e - P S ]
T  The effect of changes in the investment  tax credit
(  1T)D  M(S)  p(  J  D(t)dt + M(s)  can be determined by differentiating the RHS of (5b)
(1-T (T)  L0  with respect to I to obtain:
- M(O)  (6)  P  e-P.
Equation (5a) can readily be given a straightforward  (l-T) (l-e - P S )
economic  interpretation,  while (5b)  is analytically
more convenient.  This  term  is  unambiguously  positive  for
Equation  (5a) can be interpreted as  follows.  The  p >0 and  T < 1.  Thus,  as  originally  shown  by
term on the left hand side (LHS) of (5a), (1-T)[R(s)  Chisholm (p. 779), areduction in the investment tax
+ M (s)], represents the after-tax net marginal bene-  credit increases the optimal value of s and decreases
fit  of  holding  the  asset  at  age  s (the  asset's  net  replacement  investment because it reduces  the an-
revenue,  R(s),  plus the  change  in  its  value,  M (s),  nuity  that represents  the  average  return from  new
adjusted  for tax liabilities).  The terms on  the right  assets (and therefore  the opportunity costs of hold-
hand side (RHS)  have the following interpretations.  ing the current asset).
The first term  P--  C[0,s,1], represents the cost  A  similar  procedure  can  be  used  to  assess  the
[l-e  P s]  effects of changes in  depreciation  schedules.  First,
at  age s of delaying receipt  of net  income streams  note that  the  1986  TRA  schedule changes  do  not
from  subsequently  held  assets.  It  is  the  interest  alter the total  amount of depreciation  that  can be
charge,  p,  on  the  present  value  of  those  fut  taken  for  tax  purposes.  Thus  the  term  D(t)dt
1  taken  for  tax  purposes.  Thus  the  term  J  D(t)dt
streams,  C[0,s,l].  The  second  term,  °
[1-e-P s]  remains  the  same.  However,  the  changes  in  the
pM(s),  is the interest charge associated with holding  depreciation  schedule  do alter the present value  of
115the  tax rebates,  s  D(t)e-Pdt.  Differentiating  the  (9)  P  ep + f  D(t)ePtdt-  M()
[1-T]2[1-e- PS]  o
RHS  of (5b)  with respect to that term yields:
(7)  pT ( [1-T]  [1-e-P] )  [-  +1  2 -e-s  + P  [M  )  - D(t)dt
The remaining terms,
The  sign  of this  expression  is  also  positive  if  [1-  -ps(l+ps
p > 0 and  T < 1.  Any adjustments  in the deprecia-  (10)  - P  [-ePS(l+  ps  )  C[0,s,l]
tion  schedule  that reduce the  present value  of the  [  ]  [1-T]  [1-e  ] 2
associated tax  credits  also reduce  the annuity  that  +  P  aC[O,s,] +  M(s)
represents  average  returns  from  new  assets  and,  [l-T] [l-e - s]  ap
therefore, the opportunity cost of holding the current  T 
asset.  As a result, the optimal value of s increases.  - [l  D(t)dt - M(0)
The effects of a change in the marginal tax rate, T, represent the effects of T on the RHS of (5b) via the on the asset's  optimal replacement age  depend on ontheassetoptimalreplacementagedependon  after-tax discount rate.  The part of equation (10) in whether the tax change alters the after-tax discount
rate faced by  the farmer.  It can be argued that the  s 
before-tax  discount  rate  is likely  to change  in the  (11)  [-e(+ps)]  C[0,s,l] 
same  direction  as  the  tax  change.  Reductions  in  [l-T] [1-e-] 2 [l-T] [1-e-P s]
marginal  tax  rates  are  likely  to  have  small  (and
possibly  negative) effects  on the demand for loan-  3C[0,s,1]  T  s 
able funds because the after-tax cost of those funds  ap  + M(s) - -T  D(t)dt-  3p  +  M  os)-[l-T] to borrowers rises.  At the same time, the supply of  is the derivave of the LHS of (b)  with respect top.
loanable funds is likely to increase because after-tax
returns to lender  showedrise.  The net effect of a reduction  er  shoe  that th(11)  and, returns to lenders rise.  The net effect of a reduction
therefore,  the  effects  of a change  in the  after-tax in marginal tax rates on the before-tax discount ratee  t  o  a  n  ae 
*is  therefore  likely to  be negatve.  The  degree to  discount rate  on  the  optimal replacement  age  are is therefore  likely  to  be negative.  The  degree  to
ambiguous.  An increase  in  p,  for  example,  de- which the after-tax  discount rate  changes depends  ambiguous.  An increase  in  p,  for  example,  de-
which  * the* aft  x d  n  re  creases  the capital recovery  factor  (reflected  in the on the elasticities of demand and supply for loanable
funds.  first term  of equation  (11)  involving C[0,s,1])  and
I*funds.  r-a  icutae(hc  a  ed-  has the effect of increasing s.  On the other hand, to
If the before-tax  discount rate (which  can be de-  the extent that the annuity associated with the own-
fined as  [  ) remains constant, differentiating the  ership of future units of assets decreases,  an effect
[l-T]  reflected in the second term, the opportunity cost of
RHS  of (5b) with respect to T and allowing for the  holding the current asset one period longer rises and
effects of a change in T on p  yields the following  s tends to decrease.
expression:
If,  in  fact,  the  after-tax  discount  rate  does  not
change  (or  change  measurably)  as  a  result  of
(8)  _____2  [le~P + f  D(t)e~dt - M()]  changes in marginal tax rates, the effects of a change
[1-]2  [1-e p ] D(t)e-Ptdt  M() [1_T]2 [i_  psj]  o  in marginal tax rates on  optimal replacement rates
can be determined  by examining  equation  (9).  In
I-T]  rI-e~PS  L T]2  [  1  eM()-J  D(t)dt]  that  expression  the  first  term  (Ie-P+
[[IJLL  -e  JS]  J  I D(t)e-Ptdt - M(0))  represents the present value of
P  [l-e  Ps(l+ps)]  C[O,s,1]  the difference between the sum of the depreciation
[1T]  L[1-T]  [1-e  PS] 2 allowances  and  investment  tax  credits  associated
__+  __ p  acC[0,s,1]  with the asset and its purchase price over a period of
[1-Ti  [l-e  +  M(  s)  length s.  The term  will be negative if the present
-T  '  -]  value  of investment  tax  credits  and  depreciation
- T]- J  D(t)dt-  M(0)  allowances  is  less  than  the  purchase  price  of  the
[1T]  o  '  asset.  If,  for  example,  a  tractor  subject  to  a  10
The  direct  effects  of T on  the components  of the  percent investment tax credit were fully depreciated
revenue  stream  in equation  (5b)  consist of the first  over a five year period using the  1981  ERTA U.S.
two terms in equation (8); that is,  tax  code accelerated  cost recovery  system  (which
116was much more generous  than the current scheme),  present value of holding the asset; that is, C[0,s,l].
then the nominal discount rate would have to be less  The first order condition obtained by differentiating
than 4.48 percent for the term to be positive.  Under  equation (3) with respect to s may be written as:
the  1986  modified  accumulated  cost  recovery  T  S
scheme, depreciation allowances would have to be  (12)  R(s)+ M(s)= pM(s)-  P  T)  J  D(t)dt  M(0)
spread over eight years (allowing for the effects of
the half-year rule under which a firm can take only  The asset will be disposed of at the moment in time
half of the  first year depreciation  allowance  in the  when the before-tax net marginal benefit of holding
year  of  purchase)  and  the  nominal  discount  rate  the asset [the net revenue from the asset  R(s)  plus
would then have to be less than 3 percent for the term  the change in value, M'(s)], is equal to the holding
to  be  positive.  Since  the  1960s  both  actual  and  charge,  pM(s),  less  the  interest  yield obtained  by
expected  nominal  before-tax  and after-tax  market  avoiding  tax liabilities  associated with the balance
discount  rates  have  typically  been  substantially  T  p s
greater than 5 percent and thus the term has gener-  adjustment  term  p  D(t)dt- M(  In
ally been negative.2 (  T)o 
The second term in equation  (9) contains  the ex-  this case  the investment tax credit has no effect on
s  the timing of the scrapping decision.  Moreover, tax
pression M(0)  - J  D(t)dt . This expression repre-  and depreciation allowance adjustments play a role
i.  ^.^  0° ^  ^  . ^  only  if  the  balance  adjustment  term  is  nonzero. sents the  difference between  the price  of the asset  in the tx cod  will therefore  have either Changes in  the tax code  will therefore  have either and the total amount of depreciation  claimed for tax  no  effect  or  very  little  effect  on  most  scrapping purposes  over the life of the asset.  The term is zero  ii  . ,  ii .^  .n~  .^~  L^ •decisions.  Thus,  only  replacement  decisions  are under all  of the depreciation  schemes  permitted in  e  i  t  examined in the simulations presented below. the U.S. since 1981 if the asset is held for longer than
its tax life.
Overall,  therefore,  if  the  after-tax  discount  rate  SIMULATIONS
remains  constant  or its effects are  negligible, a re-  r  inic  X^ .. ,The  analytical results indicate that the net effects duction  in the marginal  tax rate  generally reducesA  provision on optimal replacement of the 1986 TRA  provision on optimal replacement the optimal  age of the  asset and by implication  is  agesareambiguos.  TheTRAabolished the invest-
likely to increase replacement investment.  The rea-  ment  tax credit and  reduced  the present value  of son is that the net effect of the tax cut is to increase  depreciation  credits.  Theanalyticalresultssug- depreciation tax credits.  The analytical results sug- the present value to the firm of the after-tax earnings  gest that both provisions  presented in equations (6) from future assets (net of depreciation allowances)  a  (  i  and (7)  tend  to increase optimal replacement ages by  more  than  it  reduces  the  present  value  of the  and reduce replacement investment.  On  the other depreciation  allowances  associated  with  the  asset. depreciation  allowances  a  d wh te at.  hand, equations  (8)  through (11)  indicate that lower Thus, future assets become more attractive.  At the  i  i  > ~~  . .~  ~  *^~  . ~marginal  tax rates  tend to reduce  optimal replace- lower marginal  tax rate, the  firm wants  to acquire 
^  iX  . .^^4"^ ~ment ages and increase replacement investment.  In the  larger net revenue streams  associated  with the  u .6  . a  ii  this  section,  therefore,  a  simulation  technique  is new  assets  sooner  and  so replaces  existing  assets  u  t  a  A i  used  to assess  whether  the  1986  TRA is  likely  to more quickly. ~more quic  ~kl~y.  ~increase  or  reduce  optimal  replacement  ages  for
Effects  of Changes in the Tax Structure on  farm assets.
Optimal Scrapping Decisions Optimal  Scrapping  Decisions  Assuming that the after-tax discount rate remains
The firm  also  may  consider  scrapping  the asset  constant,  the  1986  TRA  tax  adjustments  can  be
(not replacing it).  Formally,  its problem  then is to  shown to affect  only the  following components of
select the value for s that maximizes the "one cycle"  the RHS of equation (5b):3
2Between 1970 and  1987, for example, annual  average nominal before-tax interest rates charged on new loans by the Federal
Land Banks never fell below 7.42 percent  [United States Department  of Agriculture].  In all except three of those years rates  were
greater than 8 percent and between  1980 and 1987 were in the range of 10.39 to 12.1 percent.  Nominal after-tax discount rates for
the vast majority of farmers were thus considerably  greater than 5 percent for most of the 18 year period.  Since  1980, even farms in
the highest marginal corporate  and income tax brackets (which at their maximums were, respectively, 46 percent and 50 percent)
have faced after-tax discount rates in excess of 5 percent.
3Details of the proof for this result are available from the author.  Note that the changes in the 1986 TRA  rules directly  affect all
terms in equation (Sb) other than residual earnings, the R(t)'s, and the resale price of the asset, M(s).  In fact, it is quite conceivable
that indirect or secondary  effects on the behavior of agricultural  commodity and asset markets  could occur.  However,  such feedback
effects  cannot be accounted for in this type of asset replacement model.
117(13)  -M(0) + Ie+  T fD (t)e-Ptdt  excess of 15 percent (Durst).  As a result of the TRA,
[1  -pe]  ]  +e  TD  (t)e  -dt  over 75 percent of all farmers  face a  marginal in-
come tax rate of 15  percent.  The  1986 TRA also
reduced corporate tax rates for all firms except those
- T  D (t) dt-  M(0)  e- Ps  earning profits of less  than $25,000.  The  largest
{_]o  J  reduction in corporate tax rates was from 46 percent
to  34  percent  for  firms  with  profits  in  excess  of
-￿  J D(t)dt -M''  M  $100,000.
(1-T) [o  J  0.  Three  broad categories  or classes of assets  were
considered in the simulations:  (1)  light trucks and
In addition to the marginal tax rate (T), the expres-  machinery with tax depreciation lives adjusted from
sion depends on the assumed after-tax discount rate  three years to five years, (2)  heavy machinery  and
(p), the optimal replacement age of the asset (s), and  equipment (e.g., tractors) with tax depreciation  lives
its purchase  price  (M(0)).  The  simulations  were  adjusted  from  five  to  seven  years  and  (3)  farm
carried out in the following manner.  In each case,  structures with tax depreciation lives adjusted from
an initial optimal replacement age was assumed for  18 years to 20 years.  In all cases the assets are  no
an asset with an arbitrarily  selected purchase price,  longer subject to investment tax credits on the accel-
M(0), owned by a farm facing an initial marginal tax  erated capital recovery schedules  (ACRS) with op-
rate and a fixed after-tax  discount rate.  The farm-  timal  switching  to  straight  line  depreciation
firm was assumed initially to be operating under the  permitted  under the  Economic  Recovery  Tax  Act
provisions  of ERTA  that  permitted  a  10  percent  (ERTA).  Under  the TRA,  the first two  classes  of
investment tax credit and use of the ACRS depreci-  assets became  subject to  the modified  accelerated
ation tax allowances.4 An initial value for equation  capital  recovery  schedules  (MACRS)  double  de-
(13)  was  computed  using these  assumptions.  The  dining balance with optimal switching depreciation
value  of equation  (13)  was then recomputed using  schedules  and  the  half-year  rule  that  spreads  tax
several new marginal tax rates under the assumption  depreciation  allowances  over  an  additional  year.
that the farm used  the TRA depreciation schedules  The third type of asset also became  subject to the
and  could  not claim  any  investment  tax  credits.  half-year rule and 1.5 accelerated  depreciation with
Through  this process it was possible to identify the  optimal switching.  Although each firm is permitted
marginal tax rate that left the value of equation (13)  to expense up to $10,000 of investment outlays each
unchanged  and therefore  also  left  the  optimal  re-  year, that expensing  option does  not apply to each
placement age for the asset unchanged.  If the farm  asset the firm acquires,  only to its total outlays on
was likely  to face a smaller (larger)  decrease in its  all new assets.  In this analysis, it was assumed that
tax  rate than  the  one required  to  leave the  asset's  the asset being  acquired was a marginal  asset that
replacement  age  unchanged  then,  from  equation  did  not  provide  the  firm  with  the  opportunity  to
(5b),  the  optimal  replacement  age  for  the  asset  expense its outlays.  If, however,  expensing is per-
would rise (fall).  mitted on an asset because it is genuinely marginal
The  provisions  that  affect  personal  income  tax  then, depending on the initial acquisition cost of the
rates  may  be  most  important  for  the agricultural  asset,  the  expensing  option  might be  worth  more
sector  as  (according  to  the  1982  U.S.  Census  of  than  the  investment  tax  credit it  replaced.  In  all
Agriculture)  86.9 percent of all farms were  owned  other cases, expensing only provides a windfall gain
by  an  individual  or  family  and  10.4  percent  by  to the firm that (if the industry  is perfectly compet-
partnerships.  Only  2.7 percent  of all  farms  were  itive) will be competed away over time through the
owned by corporations.  In addition, 86.2 percent of  entry of new  firms  (or a  slow  down in  the exit of
all farm  acreage  was  operated  by  proprietorships  existing firms).
and partnerships  and only  13.8 percent by corpora-  The  results  of  the  simulations  are  presented  in
tions.  In most cases,  the effects  of the  1986 TRA  Tables  1 and  2  for  each  class  of asset  under  the
were to reduce marginal  tax rates for farmers.  The  assumption  of a  10  percent discount  rates and  an
USDA estimates that, in 1986, more than half of all  arbitrarily  selected  initial  value  for  the  asset  of
farmers faced marginal personal income tax rates in  $10,000.  Table  1 shows the new  marginal tax rate
4Accelerated Cost Recovery  Schedules  were defined under the  1981 ERTA and a firm was permitted to switch to straight-line
depreciation at the optimal moment (in terms of maximizing the present value of depreciation  allowances).
SThe results are not very sensitive to changes in this assumption, which is not surprising given the ambiguity associated with the
effects of the changes in the discount rate on optimal scrapping  ages indicated by equation (11).
118Table 1.  Marginal  Tax Rates Required to Leave Optimal Replacement Ages  Unchanged for Three Classes
of Assets Under the Provisions of the 1986 TRA.
Initial 1981  1986 TRA Marginal Tax  Rates (%)
Class Of  Marginal  Optimal Replacement Age (Years)
Assets  Tax Rate(%)  S=5  S=6  S=7  S=8  S=9  S=10  S=15  S=20  S=25  S=30
Class  1  50  12  11  10  10  9  8
Assets  45  4  3  2  2  1  0
40  N  N  N  N  N  N
Class  2  50  24  23  22
Assets  45  17  16  15
40  10  9  8
35  2  1  0
Class 3  50  45  45  44
Assets  40  34  34  33
30  23  22  22
20  11  11  11
10  0  0  0
Note that S denotes the optimal  replacement age of an asset and that the  1986 TRA marginal tax rate  is  the marginal
tax rate that leaves the optimal replacement age constant. Also,  N  denotes that no positive or zero tax rate will leave
the optimal replacement age constant under the 1986  TRA rules.
at which  the  optimal replacement  age for an asset  of less than 40 percent  under the  1981 ERTA,  the
remained constant for each of the cases considered.  marginal tax rates have to become negative in order
Table  2 shows the change in  the marginal  tax rate  to leave optimal replacement ages for class 1  assets
required  to keep  the optimal replacement age con-  unchanged.  In fact, virtually all farms are likely to
stant (i.e.,  the initial marginal  tax rate  less the new  have  experienced  smaller  tax  rate  cuts  under  the
marginal tax rate).  Initial optimal asset lives of five  1986 TRA than those required to keep class 1 asset
to  ten years  were  considered  for  the  first class of  optimal replacement  ages  constant.  Replacement
asset (light  trucks and machinery);  initial  optimal  ages for such assets therefore are likely to increase
lives of 10,  15, and 20 years were considered for the  and replacement investment rates to decline.  A sim-
second class (heavy machinery and tractors); initial  ilar  situation  exists  in  the  case  of  class  2  assets
optimal lives of 20, 25, and 30 years were considered  (tractors and heavy machinery) even though the tax
for the third class (farm structures).  If a farm expe-  rate  adjustments  required  for  neutrality  are  more
rienced a shift to a higher marginal tax rate than the  modest.
one indicated  in the table, the optimal replacement  In marked contrast, tax cuts required to leave the
age for  the  asset would  increase  and replacement  optimal  replacement  ages  of class  3 assets  (farm
investment rates would decline.  If the farm shifted  structures)  unchanged  are  much  smaller.  Table  2
to a lower marginal  tax rate than the one indicated  shows that the sizes of the cuts lie in the range of 5
then  the optimal  replacement  age  would  fall  and  to 9 percent depending on the initial optimal replace-
replacement  investment rates would increase.  ment age for the asset and the initial tax bracket for
In the case of class  1 assets, Table 1 shows that  the  farm.  The  actual  marginal  tax  rate  changes
farms facing 50 percent marginal tax rates under the  experienced by many farms under the terms of the
1981  ERTA would have to experience marginal tax  1986 TRA are  likely  to exceed those  required  for
rates of between 8 percent and  12 percent under the  replacement age "neutrality."  Thus, as a result of the
1986 TRA (depending  on the initial optimal age of  1986 TRA, on average optimal replacement ages for
the asset)  in order for the optimal replacement  age  farm structures  are  likely  to  fall  and replacement
for the  asset to be unchanged.  In other words,  as  investment rates to increase.  The major reason for
shown  in  Table  2, their  marginal  tax  rates  would  the different conclusion with respect to class 3  assets
have to fall by between 38 and 42 percent.  Similarly  is that the 1986 TRA caused much smaller changes
large  marginal  tax  rate  declines would  have to be  in the present value of depreciation  tax  credits for
experienced by farms with initial marginal tax rates  assets with long tax lives than for assets with short
of 45 percent.  For farms facing marginal  tax rates  tax lives.  Thus, larger assets required much smaller
119Table 2.  Changes  in  Marginal Tax  Rates Required to Leave Optimal Replacement  Ages Unchanged Under
the 1986 TRA.
~~~Initial  1981  -1986  TRA  Marginal Tax Rates (%) Initial  1981
Class Of  Marginal  Optimal Replacement Age (Years)
Assets  Tax Rate (%) Assets  Tax Rate (%)  S=5  S=6  S=7  S=8  S=9  S=10  S=15  S=20  S=25  S=30
Class  1  50  38  39  40  40  41  42
Assets  45  41  42  43  43  44  45
40  >40  >40  >40  >40  >40  >40
Class  2  50  26  27  28
Assets  45  28  29  30
40  30  31  32
35  33  34  35
Class 3  50  5  5  6
Assets  40  6  6  7
30  7  8  8
20  9  9  9
10  10  10  10
Note that S denotes the optimal scrapping age of an asset.
marginal tax rate adjustments to keep their optimal  suggest that  on average  the TRA is more likely  to
replacement ages constant.  discourage early replacement than to encourage it.
The above simulations were carried out under the
assumption of an initial optimal replacement age for  CONCLUSIONS
the  asset in  question and examine the  direction  in  Provisions  of the  1986  TRA that resulted  in the
which the optimal age will move from that original  abolition of the investment tax credit and reductions
level.  A recent paper by Lynne  demonstrates  that  in the present values of tax depreciation allowances
multiple optimal replacement ages are possible.  If  will  increase  optimal  replacement  and  scrapping
the  number  of  optimal  replacement  ages  is  not  ages for physical assets.  On the other hand, cuts in
changed,  the  conclusions  presented  here will  still  marginal income and corporate  tax rates associated
hold.  Each of  the multiple optimal replacement ages  with the TRA will reduce optimal replacement  and
will change in the same direction (though probably  scrapping ages and increase replacement investment
by differing amounts)  given the assumptions about  rates.  The results  of simulations indicate  that the
other parameters in the simulations.  Problems arise  combined  effects  of  the  provisions  to abolish  the
only if the number of equilibrium replacement ages  investment tax credit and to restructure depreciation
changes.  It is conceivable that the TRA could result  allowances  will dominate the effects of the cuts in
in the removal of an intermediate  optimal  replace-  marginal tax rates on optimal replacement ages for
ment age.  All of the remaining equilibria could have  class  1 and class  2 assets,  physical  assets with tax
increased, but a switch to a lower optimal  replace-  depreciation  lives of less  than  seven  years.  Thus
ment age by those firms that previously selected the  optimal  replacement ages  for those  assets will in-
now  defunct  intermediate  equilibrium  age  could  crease.  Such assets include almost  all equipment
reduce the average replacement age across all firms  and machinery.  In contrast, the reverse holds true
for  assets  of that  type.  However,  that  outcome  for class 3  assets such as farm structures whose tax
seems unlikely.  Lynne suggests  that multiple equi-  depreciation  lives exceed 20 years.
librium replacement ages occur when the expensing  Ceteris  paribus, suppliers of farm equipment and
option is available and that the expensing  option is  machinery are likely  to face lower rates of demand
responsible for optima that occur earlier rather than  for their products  over the long run.  The outcome,
later.  Although he does not examine the investment  however,  depends  on the impact of the  1986 TRA
tax  credit,  it  has  effects  similar  to  those  of the  on the price of capital  services relative to the prices
expensing option on the net revenue streams associ-  of other agricultural  inputs.  If the  1986 TRA raises
ated with an  asset.  The TRA removes investment  the price of machinery and equipment services rel-
tax credits  and its expensing option  does not affect  ative to the prices  of other farm inputs because of
the purchase of many assets.  Thus, Lynne's findings  the loss of the investment tax credit and lower de-
120preciation allowances (but does not alter measurably  type of analysis would require considerable amounts
the price of agricultural  products  relative  to other  of accurate  data  on residual  earnings streams  and
products)  then  the  demand for  services  from  ma-  asset  acquisition  and  resale  prices  that  are  often
chinery and equipment is likely to decline  in each  difficult to obtain.  An exception is Lynne's study of
future  time period,  implying reductions  in optimal  sugar cane.  A more extensive analysis should also
levels of net investment as well as optimal levels of  account  for the effects  of uncertainty about future
replacement investment.  The story with respect to  input  and  output prices,  yields,  and  tax  policies.
farm structures  is different.  The results  presented  Prices, yields, and Federal government tax policies
here suggest that optimal replacement lives for such  are  likely  to  vary  a  great  deal  over  the  farmer's
assets will fall, implying higher rates of replacement  planning  horizon.  In  the  case  of government  tax
investment.  programs, for example, since  1980 there have been
One important extension of this research would be  three  major  revisions  in  the  tax  code  concerning
to  examine  simultaneously  farm  decisions  about  depreciation allowances (The 1981 ERTA, revisions
replacement and net investment.  A second  exten-  to the ACRS that were implemented in 1984 and the
sion would be  to provide  a clear link between  the  1986 TRA).  The marginal income  tax rate sched-
analysis and the  literature on asset fixity.  Clearly,  ules have been adjusted on at least four occasions.
an  increase  (decrease)  in the  optimal replacement  Since 1950, the investment tax credit has appeared,
age for a physical asset would increase  (decrease)  been expanded, and disappeared  so frequently that
the  apparent  fixity  of that  asset  on  the  farm.  now it almost seems to exhibit the properties of the
Whether  that  is  good  or  bad  is  entirely  another  Cheshire cat-once observed it immediately begins
matter.  A third useful extension would be to quan-  to fade away.  The effects of changes  in tax policy
tify the size of the effects of the TRA on replacement  as a source of uncertainty require  special attention
ages and rates for each type of asset.  However, this  in future asset replacement studies.
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